privacy: Reviewed subsec:prv-attacks
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@ -29,15 +29,14 @@ Information disclosure is typically achieved by combining supplementary (backgro
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In its general form, this is known as \emph{adversarial} or \emph{linkage} attack.
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In its general form, this is known as \emph{adversarial} or \emph{linkage} attack.
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Even though many works directly refer to the general category of linkage attacks, we distinguish also the following sub-categories, addressed in the literature:
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Even though many works directly refer to the general category of linkage attacks, we distinguish also the following sub-categories, addressed in the literature:
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\paragraph{Sensitive attribute domain} knowledge.
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\begin{itemize}
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Here we can identify \emph{homogeneity and skewness} attacks~\cite{machanavajjhala2006diversity,li2007t}, when statistics of the sensitive attribute values are available, and \emph{similarity attack}, when semantics of the sensitive attribute values are available.
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\item \emph{Sensitive attribute domain knowledge} can result in \emph{homogeneity and skewness} attacks~\cite{machanavajjhala2006diversity,li2007t}, when statistics of the sensitive attribute values are available, and \emph{similarity attack}, when semantics of the sensitive attribute values are available.
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\item \emph{Complementary release attacks}~\cite{sweeney2002k} with regard to previous releases of different versions of the same and/or related data sets.
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\paragraph{Complementary release} attacks~\cite{sweeney2002k} with regard to previous releases of different versions of the same and/or related data sets.
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In this category, we also identify the \emph{unsorted matching} attack~\cite{sweeney2002k}, which is achieved when two privacy-protected versions of an original data set are published in the same tuple ordering.
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In this category, we also identify the \emph{unsorted matching} attack~\cite{sweeney2002k}, which is achieved when two privacy-protected versions of an original data set are published in the same tuple ordering.
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Other instances include: (i)~the \emph{join} attack~\cite{wang2006anonymizing}, when tuples can be identified by joining (on the (quasi-)identifiers) several releases, (ii)~the \emph{tuple correspondence} attack~\cite{fung2008anonymity}, when in case of incremental data certain tuples correspond to certain tuples in other releases, in an injective way, (iii)~the \emph{tuple equivalence} attack~\cite{he2011preventing}, when tuples among different releases are found to be equivalent with respect to the sensitive attribute, and (iv)~the \emph{unknown releases} attack~\cite{shmueli2015privacy}, when the privacy preservation is performed without knowing the previously privacy-protected data sets.
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Other instances include: (i)~the \emph{join} attack~\cite{wang2006anonymizing}, when tuples can be identified by joining (on the (quasi-)identifiers) several releases, (ii)~the \emph{tuple correspondence} attack~\cite{fung2008anonymity}, when in case of incremental data certain tuples correspond to certain tuples in other releases, in an injective way, (iii)~the \emph{tuple equivalence} attack~\cite{he2011preventing}, when tuples among different releases are found to be equivalent with respect to the sensitive attribute, and (iv)~the \emph{unknown releases} attack~\cite{shmueli2015privacy}, when the privacy preservation is performed without knowing the previously privacy-protected data sets.
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\item \emph{Data dependence} either within one data set or among one data set and previous data releases, and/or other external sources~\cite{kifer2011no, chen2014correlated, liu2016dependence, zhao2017dependent}.
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We will look into this category in more detail later in Section~\ref{sec:correlation}.
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\paragraph{Data dependence} either within one data set or among one data set and previous data releases, and/or other external sources~\cite{kifer2011no, chen2014correlated, liu2016dependence, zhao2017dependent}.
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\end{itemize}
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We will look into this category in more detail later in Section~\ref{sec:correlation}.
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The first sub-category of attacks has been mainly addressed in works on snapshot microdata publishing, and is still present in continuous publishing; however, algorithms for continuous publishing typically accept the proposed solutions for the snapshot publishing scheme (see discussion over $k$-anonymity and $l$-diversity in Section~\ref{subsec:prv-seminal}).
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The first sub-category of attacks has been mainly addressed in works on snapshot microdata publishing, and is still present in continuous publishing; however, algorithms for continuous publishing typically accept the proposed solutions for the snapshot publishing scheme (see discussion over $k$-anonymity and $l$-diversity in Section~\ref{subsec:prv-seminal}).
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This kind of attacks is tightly coupled with publishing the (privacy-protected) sensitive attribute value.
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This kind of attacks is tightly coupled with publishing the (privacy-protected) sensitive attribute value.
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@ -49,7 +48,6 @@ By the data dependence attack, the status of Donald could be more certainly infe
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In order to better protect the privacy of Donald in case of attacks, the data should be privacy-protected in a more adequate way (than without the attacks).
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In order to better protect the privacy of Donald in case of attacks, the data should be privacy-protected in a more adequate way (than without the attacks).
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\subsection{Levels of privacy protection}
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\subsection{Levels of privacy protection}
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\label{subsec:prv-levels}
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\label{subsec:prv-levels}
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