The main idea of the privacy-preserving {\thething} selection component is to privately select extra {\thething} event timestamps, i.e.,~dummy {\thethings}, from the set of timestamps $T /\ L$ of the time series $S_T$ and add them to the original {\thething} set $L$.
Selecting extra events, on top of the actual {\thethings}, as dummy {\thethings} can render actual ones indistinguishable.
The goal is to select a list of sets with additional timestamps from a series of events at timestamps $T$ for a set of {\thethings} at $L \subseteq T$.
First, we generate a set of dummy {\thething} set options by adding regular event timestamps from $T /\ L$ to $L$ (Section~\ref{subsec:lmdk-set-opts}).
Then, we utilize the exponential mechanism, with a utility function that calculates an indicator for each of the options in the set based on how much it differs from the original {\thething} set $L$, and randomly select one of the options (Section~\ref{subsec:lmdk-opt-sel}).
This process provides an extra layer of privacy protection to {\thethings}, and thus allows the release, and thereafter processing, of {\thething} timestamps.
% We utilize the exponential mechanism with a utility function that calculates an indicator for each of the options in the set that we selected in the previous step.
% The utility depends on the positioning of the {\thething} timestamps of an option in the series, e.g.,~the distance from the previous/next {\thething}, the distance from the start/end of the series, etc.
Function \evalSeq evaluates the result of the union of $L$ and a timestamp combination from $T \setminus L$ by, e.g.,~estimating the standard deviation of all the distances from the previous/next {\thething}.
\getOpts returns all the possible \emph{valid} sets of combinations \opt such that larger options contain all of the timestamps that are present in smaller ones.
Each combination contains a set of timestamps with sizes $\left|L\right| +1, \left|L\right| +2, \dots, \left|T\right|$, where each one of them is a combination of $L$ with $x \in[1, \left|T\right| -\left|L\right|]$ timestamps from $T$.
Algorithm~\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-opt}, between Lines~{\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-opt-for-each}--\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-opt-end}} evaluates each option in \opts.
It finds the option that is the most \emph{similar} to the original (Lines~{\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-opt-comparison}-\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-opt-end}}), i.e.,~the option that has an evaluation that differs the least from that of the sequence $T$ with {\thethings}$L$.
Algorithm~\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-opt} guarantees to return the optimal set of dummy {\thethings} with regard to the original set $L$.
However, it is rather costly in terms of complexity: given $n$ regular events and a combination of size $r$, it requires $\mathcal{O}(C(n, r)+2^C(n, r))$ time and $\mathcal{O}(r*C(n, r))$ space.
Next, we present a heuristic solution with improved time and space requirements.
\paragraph{Heuristic}
Algorithm~\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-heur}, follows an incremental methodology.
At each step it selects a new timestamp that corresponds to a regular ({non-\thething}) event from $T \setminus L$.
Similar to Algorithm~\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-opt}, the selection is done based on a predefined metric (Lines~{\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-heur-comparison}-\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-heur-comparison-end}}).
This process (Lines~{\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-heur-while}-\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-heur-end}}) goes on until we select a set that is equal to the size of the series of events, i.e.,~$L' = T$.
In terms of complexity: given $n$ regular events it requires $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$ time and space.
Note that the reverse heuristic approach, i.e.,~starting with $T${\thethings} and removing until $L$, performs similarly with Algorithm~\ref{algo:lmdk-sel-heur}.
Events that occur at recent timestamps are more likely to reveal sensitive information regarding the users involved~\cite{kellaris2014differentially}.
Thus, taking into account more recent events with respect to {\thethings} can result in less privacy loss and better privacy protection overall.
This leads to worse data utility.
% Depending on the {\thething} discovery technique
The values of events near a {\thething} are usually similar to that of the latter.
Therefore, privacy-preserving mechanisms are likely to approximate their values based on the nearest {\thething} instead of investing extra privacy budget to perturb their actual values; thus, spending less privacy budget.
Saving privacy budget for releasing perturbed versions of actual event values can bring about better data utility.
% Distant events
However, indicating the existence of randomized/dummy {\thethings} nearby actual {\thethings} can increase the adversarial confidence regarding the location of the latter within a series of events.
Hence, choosing randomized/dummy {\thethings} far from the actual {\thethings} (and thus less relevant) can limit the final privacy loss.